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Descartes had his cogito and Moore had his hands. Scholastics had propositions per se notae. Across times and traditions, foundationalist epistemologies demand the most concentrated attention at their beginnings. Though it is unclear whether Auriol is a foundationalist in any straightforward way, it is certain that he too shares this infatuation with starting points.
Auriol gives a sustained treatment of the problem of propositions known through themselves ( per se notae) in his Commentary on Lombard's Sentences, I, d. 2, q. 10.
2 Here, he asks whether a wayfarer can have knowledge of God's existence without the help of scriptural testimony: that is, Auriol is asking whether natural theology is possible. 3 In the course of his discussion, it becomes apparent that these per se known propositions are important to Auriol, but the extent of their importance is a bit of a surprise.
The simplest way to begin is to look at Auriol's examples of propositions known through themselves. While it was natural for those of his period broadly construed (e.g., Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham) to think of these sorts of propositions as self-evident, analytic truths-e.g., that the whole is greater than its proper part-Auriol extends this characterization considerably. For him, the following are all examples of per se known propositions:
(1) Nothing both exists and does not exist (2) The sky and the earth exist (3) Snow is white (4) God exists So how are we to explain this grouping? It might be suggested that these are the axioms of his knowledge system, propositions upon which he bases the knowledge of the truth of all other propositions. Though plausible, the last proposition-that God exists-fails to meet this characterization. For Auriol, the proposition that God exists is a syllogistically derived conclusion. In order to understand the novelty of this suggestion, it is best to begin with a look at earlier views.
After examining Auriol's most important Greek, Islamic, and Scholastic in uences in the rst section, Auriol's own view will be considered, along with a few potential weaknesses in his position. It will be shown how Auriol's reliance upon psychological certainty, rather than epistemic certainty, is crucial for gaining a full understanding of his conception of propositions per se notae.
Intellectual Background
When it came to propositions known through themselves, Auriol's predecessors gave him much to work with. As usually happened in the scholastic period, such hotly contested issues were ultimately to be traced back to Aristotle. These views were taken as a starting point, and they underwent signi cant revision as time passed.
One of Aristotle's most relevant discussions is found in the rst 10 chapters of Book I of his Posterior Analytics. 4 In this work, Aristotle presents his view of what the medievals come to call scientia, or scienti c knowledge. For Aristotle, scienti c knowledge is not of particular things.
5
Science deals only with universal, necessary propositions-e.g., that man is a rational animal. Furthermore, the only propositions that are truly known, (that is, those that are known scienti cally) are syllogistically derived con-
